After months of optimism and growing complacency last week brought a sudden reversal of market sentiment. Optimism was replaced by worry and fear. Confidence was erased, despite a 110 billion euro EU/IMF bailout package for Greece and good US economic data; fear of a sovereign debt meltdown in Europe contributed to Tuesday’s and Wednesday’s sell-off, culminating in Thursday’s bloodbath. The Dow plunged nearly 1,000 points – the largest intraday decline on record – only to recover much of the loss minutes later. Even so, equities suffered their worst session since February 2009, with all major US indices ending the day down by more than 3%.

Escalating concerns of spreading European sovereign debt crisis, aided by images of murderous riots in Greece (casting further doubt of Greece’s ability to implement proposed austerity measures), provided the catalyst for the panic sell-off. Although some believe a trading error or technical glitch may have helped on the downside, the fact is the market was already very weak before the mid-afternoon plunge. The sell-off was, it appears, driven by good old fear.

More selling on Friday – despite better than expected US nonfarm payrolls report – reinforced the growing sense of panic. Both the Dow and the S&P 500 posted the largest weekly losses since March 2009 (DJIA fell by 5.7%, S&P was down 6.4% and the Nasdaq 8%), erasing all gains for the year. As fear spiked, so did the VIX (Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index); it jumped by 86% – the largest weekly increase ever in its 20 year history. In a flight from risky assets the yen, dollar and gold were the best performers.

The EU/IMF providing just a short-term patch for Greece and no solution for other peripherals, financial markets remained unimpressed. Spreads in European sovereigns continued to blow out; the euro sliding further. There have also been increased concerns about European banks, which (as of end of 2009) hold claims of $193 billion on Greece and more than $1 trillion on Portugal, Ireland and Spain. Libor (the interbank lending rate) rose sharply as banks became increasingly suspicious of each other’s exposure to European peripheral sovereign debt.

The slide in the euro, soaring bond yields and global markets’ reaction to the crisis finally led eurozone governments to lay out a set of measures to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area. Last weekend they vaguely committed to additional fiscal consolidation and reform of the Stability and Growth Pact to ensure fiscal sustainability in the region.

As of Monday morning European leaders agreed on providing a massive rescue package of 750 billion euros ($960 billion) to eurozone countries in an effort to stop the sovereign debt crisis and contagion. Eurozone governments pledged 440 billion euros in new loans and guarantees and 60 billion under an existing lending program, with an additional 250 billion to come from the IMF.

The most dramatic intervention came with the announcement that the ECB (European Central Bank) would buy euro area public and private debt. The dollar swap line with the Fed has also been reactivated.

Yesterday’s rescue package averted an immediate crisis and will likely buy Europe some time to allow real fiscal adjustments to take place. However, while it helps eurozone sovereigns with near term financing, it does not fix the longer term debt and solvency problems.

Ultimately, Greece’s problem is not just one of liquidity but also solvency, so the country will still likely have to resort to debt restructuring (which has now been postponed). Without the option of currency devaluation, Greece must go through severe debt deflation. Incomes and tax revenues will plunge. The vicious circle of falling nominal GDP and rising debt/GDP ratio can only be stopped when growth resumes – which will be difficult without devaluation. Solvency risks will not go away anytime soon.

The euro currency downtrend will most likely continue. We may not be far away from a point when the ECB starts printing and effectively monetizing eurozone debt. Concerns of longer term viability of the single currency will also stay as peripheral economies sink deeper into debt deflation.

European periphery facing severe austerity programs and prolonged recessions will not only kill EU’s growth for the foreseeable future but also impact global demand that will go down just as the cyclical recovery is starting to face headwinds.

Where next for the markets?

Peripheral spreads have rallied spectacularly, retracing 50-75% of their widening since the end of March within just a few hours. However, this extreme narrowing is unlikely to be sustained unless the ECB continues buying peripheral debt. European, US and global equity markets also responded positively with a huge rally yesterday.

Last week’s Greek debt fallout provided a perfect trigger for corrective action – we were certainly due for one after the steep rally off the March 2009 lows. Bullish sentiment had reached levels consistent with short term tops (Investors Intelligence survey of investment advisers – a measure of the crowd’s sentiment – reported last Wednesday that 56% of advisers were bullish – the highest level since the 2007 market peak); equities and commodities were overbought. The amount of cash as a percentage of total assets at equity mutual funds was at a record low. Insider sales were at extremely high levels compared to insider buying.

At the moment it’s premature to say whether the sell-off is over; we could be seeing a relief rally, the correction could reassert itself and last for a few weeks. However, given the strong momentum from the March 2009 lows, decent valuations and good upside breadth the cyclical bull market certainly appears to be intact. The markets are bound to remain volatile for a while though.

The following chart shows the spike and subsequent decline in the VIX – also known as Wall Street’s ‘fear index’. A few weeks ago it was at 18 month lows, indicating high investor confidence (and complacency). As we’ve moved from optimism to fear and dread last week volatility rocketed, only to fall back after Monday’s eurozone bailout news.

(The VIX is a measure of the implied volatility of S&P 500 Index options. A low value indicates expected stability in the markets; a high value means expected turmoil. So the VIX tends to exhibit a strong negative correlation with equity prices.)

Another sentiment indicator, the equity put/call ratio, was also very stretched by the end of April, indicating extreme bullish sentiment. As optimism turned into fear the put/call ratio spiked up.

A look at April breadth measures also signaled an imminent correction as over 90% of S&P500 stocks traded above 50 day moving average. We dropped to oversold territory last week, before bouncing back somewhat.

As risk aversion grows US equities could benefit from a flight of capital from Europe; though it will more likely continue to flow into bonds. Importantly, the US economy is improving on all metrics.

We are now seeing a starting recovery in the labor market, based on the payrolls numbers as well as Household Survey employment data. Last Friday’s US nonfarm payrolls surprised to the upside with 290,000 jobs added in April – much better than the anticipated 180,000, with the March number revised upward to 230,000. However, the unemployment rate increased to 9.9% from 9.7% due to a surge in the workforce. (Also, census hiring added 66,000 jobs to the April number.)

There is no doubt about the strong recovery in US manufacturing, as witnessed by ISM data (at 60.4% as of April). The manufacturing sector expanded for the eighth consecutive month to its highest level since July 2004. The pace of new orders was very strong and employment within the sector continued to grow.

Consumer spending has been rising (albeit at the expense of the savings rate). Retail sales rose above expectations in April, for the fifth time in the last six months.

Despite positive US data investors remain skeptical about the health of the economic expansion. At present the consensus is for subdued economic growth; that might end up proving to be too conservative.

Short term interest rates are at their multi-decade lows. Even if rates were to start rising faster than expected, the environment will stay very stimulative for a long time. Low interest rates provide a subsidy to income, profits and economic growth.

Whereas liquidity has been the main driver of the stock market rally until now, the next phase will likely be spurred by growth and profits, with performance depending on expanding economy. Low rates, strengthening business activity and strong balance sheet conditions will drive earnings growth. (Earnings have been very positive, beating expectations in most cases. Expectations of S&P 500 operating earnings are in the region of $80-84 by the end of 2010.)

If economic growth is decent and rates stay low, profits will likely keep surprising on the upside. Of course better economic growth, employment growth and improving corporate profitability will eventually see a rise in interest rates. That alone is, however, not automatically negative for stocks. It is generally only when interest rates start to exceed the nominal GDP growth that the economy slows down. The yield curve also has to become inverted for a cyclical equity bear market to be triggered. Historically, cyclical bear markets were triggered when the yield curve became inverted at a level that was higher than the nominal GDP growth. We are nowhere near that point.

The cyclical bull market has further to go, although the pace of price gains is likely to be much slower, given the steep rally off the March 2009 lows. Most retail investors have not yet moved into equities and are sitting on the sidelines. Yet there is little reason to believe that they will not do so again once confidence in the rally becomes more widespread. Optimism should increase as evidence accumulates on the strength and durability of the economic expansion.

US fundamentals look good for now: leading indicators of growth remain strong, rates are extremely low, earnings are beating expectations, valuations are reasonable.

Equities are relatively cheap on 1-2 year forward valuations (PE of 14 and 12, respectively). Global equities valuations are also attractive at 12M forward consensus earnings multiple of 13. Emerging markets trade on a 12M forward P/E of 12, although they have, over the last two decades, grown earnings at an annual rate of 22% vs. 12% in developed markets, as well as having lower leverage and higher economic growth. Equities are also cheap relative to bonds (as per dividend yield/bond yield ratio).

Retail investors have been net sellers of equities since March 2009. The total allocation to equities by the US household sector is well below long term average. Global bond funds posted inflows of $83.5 billion this year, equity funds saw inflows of only $7 billion. Since the trough of March 2009 US equity funds inflows came to $40 billion compared to bond funds inflows of $360 billion. Retail investors have so far not participated in the rally – retail equity funds saw net outflows of $82 billion since March 2009 (though in March 2010 retail have been modest net buyers). Institutional equity funds have seen modest net inflows since March 2009. (Data from EPFR Global and Credit Suisse.)

Central banks will likely continue to flood the system with liquidity whenever deemed necessary, and the Fed will keep short term rates in real terms (inflation adjusted) below zero for a very long period of time – all of which is positive for equities. And, as noted, there is plenty of cash available from investors who have missed the rally and are still sitting on the sidelines.

I believe the cyclical bull market (i.e. rally within the secular bear that started in 2000) will go on for a while, so any 10-20% corrections may be seen as a buying opportunity for select equities.

There are of course a number of medium to long term concerns.

The situation in parts of the eurozone will remain precarious. Austerity measures will plunge the periphery into a deep and prolonged recession, while bailouts will come at the expense of the productive European economies, all dragging down demand. Europe will buy less US goods, and with the euro likely close to or at parity to the dollar US companies won’t be able to compete with European exporters. This could well slow down US growth by late 2010 and 2011. (Tax hikes will also kick in next year.)

China is tightening in an attempt to slow down its economy, amidst concerns of overheating and housing bubbles. (The Shanghai Composite Index has broken below its key 200-day moving average – a possible precursor of what’s to come in other markets?) Brazil and India (and much of the rest of the developing world) are raising interest rates to fight inflation.

Concerns also remain about US regulatory changes, including financial reform.

The US housing market is a weak spot that needs monitoring. Although prices are stabilizing, the overall picture remains worrying, in particular due to the massive amount of unsold overhang remaining in the system. On the positive side, house price to income ratio is now close to a 40-year low and yields on low-end properties are, according to Credit Suisse research, over 8% – the highest on record relative to 30-year mortgage rate.

And there are still some $6.5 trillion of excess leverage in the developed economies, which will end up reducing growth. Government bond funding will also become more of a problem in the next few years, and not just in Europe. Economies won’t be able to simply grow their way out of fiscal indebtedness. In order to stabilize government debt to GDP fiscal policy will have to be tightened significantly (in the US, UK, Japan, much of the eurozone), which will be extremely challenging both politically and economically. We are still heading toward sovereign defaults a few years from now.

If we are lucky, we may have another 12-18 months before things start getting ugly again.

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The Dubai and Greek crises have forced investors to pay attention to something long ignored – rising sovereign risk. According to this week’s reports, Dubai is trying to settle debts for 60 cents on the dollar. Meanwhile, there has been no real progress in the unfolding Greek debt crisis.

Given the scale of fiscal deterioration in much of the developed world, the trouble is unlikely to end with Greece. For now, however, this looks like a mainly EU-specific problem.

Germany is, for the moment, unwilling to talk about bailouts, and demands austerity measures from the Greek government. EU finance ministers stated Athens must comply with austerity demands within 30 days or risk losing control over its own tax and spend policies. But the truth is, the EU has no real enforcement mechanism, and Greece knows it.

The Greek government promised to reduce its fiscal deficit to 2.8% of GDP by 2012, and to under 9% by the end of this year. However, the EU authorities are fooling themselves into believing this to be possible – current Greek deficit is 12.7% (and that is only the official figure; Greece has forged data before). Due to both political and economic reasons chances of Greece meeting such targets are near zero. The Greek population is largely against austerity (and keen to express it via crippling strikes and riots), making it highly unlikely that the socialist Papandreou government will be able to enforce any meaningful measures.

Some 95% of Greek debt is held by a number of large European banks, so a Greek default would most likely spark a massive bank crisis in Europe. The contagion would inevitably spread to Portugal, Spain, Italy, Ireland and possibly other countries. But even if Greece is bailed out, it will unlikely meet the conditions that will come attached to a bailout, hence just kicking the problem down the road for another while.

And of course the problem is much larger than just Greece. Fundamentals are very poor across much of the eurozone, meaning that a number of countries could easily follow Greece down.

The root of the problem is the one-size-fits-all monetary policy of the euro. The monetary policy set for the centre (Germany, France) was always going to be inappropriate for the economies of the periphery. Instead of adopting stricter fiscal discipline (since monetary and exchange rate policy was no longer in their control), Greece, Spain, Portugal etc used the extremely low interest rates and high credit rating they gained access to thanks to the EMU to go on a long, wild spending spree. The cheap credit fueled housing bubbles as well as ever growing public sectors and generous welfare systems. It was inevitable that the day of reckoning would come.

Southern Europe’s competitiveness has also declined sharply as these countries joined the eurozone with an exchange rate that overvalued their currencies, raising the cost of labour.

The fiscally precarious states benefited from low rates because, in the eyes of investors, their bonds enjoyed an implicit guarantee of the stronger eurozone members. Once investors finally started paying attention to their fiscal situation, and to the risk of Greece being let to fail, the spreads between German Bunds and Greek bonds have widened considerably, increasing the country’s debt servicing costs.

In a staggering display of self-delusion the Greek prime minister said yesterday that Greece wants to be able to borrow on the same terms as other eurozone countries. I suppose we shouldn’t be surprised at such misguided sense of entitlement; entitlement, after all, is the theme of our times. Papandreou also stated “it is a fallacy to say the Greeks are reckless”. Yes, Greeks indeed are the model of prudence and their current fiscal mess and the fact they have been in default for 105 years out of the last 200 should just be ignored by the markets (or ‘socially useless’ speculators in modern day political speech).

Although distrusting Greece’s willingness and ability to reduce deficit, the markets, for the moment, continue to believe in an eventual bailout. Should it start looking like there will be no such thing after all, the spreads on Greek debt would dramatically expand and most likely push Greece into default.

Yet the fiscally responsible Germans have little appetite for bailing out Greece. A bailout, in their view, would destroy EU’s monetary (and any remaining fiscal) discipline and undermine the credibility of the euro. Not to mention that it would not solve the structural problems facing the eurozone. Since German taxpayers are hardly going to be willing to open their wallets to the profligate states every time there is a crisis, a bailout of Greece may only bring closer an eventual break-up of the EMU.

Having said that, German banks have massive exposure to Spanish, Irish, Italian and, to a lesser extent, Greek and Portuguese debt – to the tune of some 523 billion euros. Germany will undoubtedly take that into consideration when deciding on bailing Greece out or letting it fail.

So what are the options for Greece? The traditional remedy would be currency devaluation, but eurozone members don’t have such luxury. Control over their monetary policy is in the hands of the European Central Bank (ECB).

The most prudent thing for Greece would be to undertake the severe budget cuts necessary to get its fiscal deficit down to 3% of GDP over the next few years. Such extraordinary fiscal tightening would result in a few years of declining GDP and high unemployment. There is not much indication that Greek voters are even remotely considering taking a few years of pain (austerity & recession) for a future gain.

Another option is default, which would reduce the debt burden but also result in a severe and long recession/depression. Government spending would be cut drastically and immediately since Greece wouldn’t be able to borrow for quite some time. Finally, Greece could also decide to leave the eurozone, go back to drachma and, in effect, devalue its debt. It would make the country more competitive. Of course their borrowing costs would also soar. However, this appears to be the least likely path for Greece to take.

Essentially, Greece and the Greek voters should be given two choices: take the pain and make the necessary cuts or leave the EU. This would leave the decision in the hands of the Greek people, avoiding further cries of them being stripped of their sovereignty, and it would ultimately be better for EU’s monetary and fiscal discipline than a bailout and the moral hazards that come with it.

After all, Greece is not eurozone’s only problem. Budget deficits have reached unprecedented proportions in many EU countries. Concerns about the weak fundamentals and the state of public finances in Portugal, Spain, Italy, Ireland, the UK are evident in the financial markets, with rising sovereign bond yields and sliding euro.

Portugal’s and Spain’s external debt position is worse than that of Greece; their household debt is also considerably higher. Spain, apart from a nearly 10% deficit, has unemployment close to 20% and a banking system weighted down by a massive amount of overvalued real estate. Oh, and the socialist Zapatero government is not any more likely to be able and willing to cut spending than the Greeks. Italy’s and Ireland’s external debt obligations as well as GDP and unemployment rates are also worse than those of Greece. So while the markets’ focus is primarily on Greece, contagion is a very real threat. And not even Germany has the finances to bail out the likes of Spain. Given its size, a full blown fiscal crisis (or default) in Spain would most likely be the death of the euro.

The eurozone governments have to borrow approx 2.2 trillion euros from the capital markets this year to finance their budget deficits (Greece needs some 60 billion just to make it through the year); it won’t be an easy task. A wider fiscal crisis in Europe appears increasingly likely.

Yet ballooning national debts, out of control deficits and rising sovereign risks are not just a European issue. Most advanced economies have huge fiscal problems. The IMF projects the G20 government debt/GDP ratio to reach 118% by 2014. This will severely constrain economic growth.

A recent study by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff (‘Growth in a Time of Debt’) found that “the relationship between government debt and real GDP growth is weak for debt/GDP ratios below a threshold of 90 percent of GDP. Above 90 percent, median growth rates fall by one percent, and average growth falls considerably more.”

The following chart shows the public debt to GDP ratios across the world.

(And let’s not forget the true public debt/GDP levels are several times higher then the explicit figures that exclude massive unfunded liabilities for public pensions, healthcare, social security.)

Consider also the high government spending as a percentage of GDP in many advanced economies today, which causes a further drag on growth, and you get a future of slow economic growth and high unemployment. (In Greece, as well as the US, UK and other countries government spending now makes for approx 50% of GDP.)

The fiscal deterioration will become worse still due to the massive demographic challenges in the developed world. The IMF estimates that increased health spending and other costs related to aging population will drive debt to GDP levels of advanced economies up by a further 50% over the next 20 years.

We will therefore see a significantly higher economic growth in low debt, and most likely sluggish growth in high debt economies such as the UK, US, much of the eurozone and Japan. (A strong rise in government bond yields of much of the developed world is also inevitable.)

But it’s not just government debt. There’s too much debt everywhere, including in the private sector (although the private sector has started deleveraging, while the public sector increased leverage). Total debt is highest in Japan at 459% of GDP and the UK at 469% of GDP (or 380% if adjusted to reflect UK’s position as a financial hub). Spain follows in the third place at 342% (in Greece total private-public debt stands at around 225% of GDP).  

Over the next decade sovereign debt crises and defaults seem inevitable. Those countries that can resort to the printing presses will take the path of a massive monetization of debt, hence reducing their debts through severe inflation. That is the most likely outcome in the US and UK. (Clearly, paying our debts back in devalued currency is simply default by another name.)

Of course the most desirable way to address the budget problems would be by radical spending cuts. The scale of fiscal tightening necessary to return to healthier debt levels would cause a medium-term drag on growth. But not reducing debt will ultimately have much greater consequences.

However, chances we will witness drastic spending cuts in the UK, US and across the eurozone in the next few years are rather slim. The culture of entitlement has made it near impossible to talk about the hard facts. Our political elites will continue to ignore the fact that the bloated welfare states have become unsustainable and we can no longer afford them. The reason is simple – it’s not what the voters want to hear. Instead of acknowledging painful reality and the need to make sacrifices, we prefer to keep kicking the problems into the future. Until the inevitable day of reckoning comes.

Indeed the developments in the US and UK are not at all encouraging.

The Obama administration is determined not to waste a good crisis and continues to focus on a massive expansion of government. Instead of letting the free markets work and acknowledging that it’s the private sector that creates wealth and will be the engine of growth, the political leaders on both sides of the Atlantic show an enormous zeal to meddle in the free markets and reinvent and fix what wasn’t broken.

Redistribution of wealth via tax hikes (as well as introduction of entirely new taxes), a ruinous healthcare reform, expensive energy and climate change legislation, pro-union policies, excessive and ill thought-out regulation… Obama has shown a deep lack of understanding (and indeed contempt) of private business and a determination to socialize the US economy.

And while the productive part of the economy is being hammered, the public sector has been enjoying an unprecedented boom. In 1902 total US government spending was approx 7% of GDP. In 1928 it came to just over 10%; two thirds of that was state and local and just 3% was federal spending (about the same as 150 years earlier, excluding increases during war periods). Government spending has since exploded, making for more than 40% of GDP – two thirds of that being federal expenditure. Public spending increases in 2009 alone came to well over $1 trillion, a rise of more than 20% from 2008.

The UK has fared even worse, with government spending increasing from about 36% of GDP to almost 55%, putting increasing pressure on the dwindling productive segment of the economy.

The following chart from the Wall Street Journal shows the shocking and unsustainable spending explosion. US government spending has grown seven times as much in real terms as median household income over the last 40 years!

And, just as in the UK, employment and compensation in the public sector have continued to increase while the private sector has taken the pain. (Public workers not only enjoy far higher wages than their private sector counterparts but also benefit from extremely generous pensions. These largely unfunded public sector pension liabilities will naturally just serve as further drag on economic growth for many decades to come.)

As the following chart from the Business Insider shows, the US has gone from producing jobs in wealth creating private industries to jobs in the wealth destroying government sector. By the end of 2007 the total number of government jobs exceeded the total number of goods producing jobs.

Indeed, whether we look at the public sector gorging itself at the expense of the private sector, or the widespread culture of entitlement and welfare state (at the expense of the dwindling numbers of hard working taxpayers), this is what has come to characterize our time: enabling the unproductive and lazy to steal from the productive and enterprising. Otherwise called socialism.

So what is being done? Do we see any plans for serious fiscal tightening and debt reduction? Quite the opposite, our leaders seem to be enjoying a rather long vacation from reality.

Obama (and Gordon Brown) have apparently not been listening to Reinhart and Rogoff, or they wouldn’t be attempting to solve our problems by issuing yet more debt.

Perhaps we shouldn’t be too surprised that debt reduction doesn’t seem to be our policy makers’ priority. Indeed, one might think our extreme indebtedness is nothing more than a minor nuisance. Neither our political elites nor the central bankers and leading economists appear to grasp the obvious: that years of cheap, excessive credit and high debt were precisely what got us into trouble. And yet we’re still happily continuing on the same path.

In only three years the Obama administration will have increased the national debt by some $4.35 trillion. (And that excludes the huge deficits of off-budget programs like Medicare, Medicaid, social security.) The budget freeze proposed by the administration for 2011 is projected to save some $15 billion (or about 0.4% of the total budget, a drop in the ocean). Note that it’s merely a budget freeze, not a cut in nominal terms. Worse still, the the vast majority of federal programs (incl. Medicare, Medicaid, social security, military, homeland security etc) are to be exempt from the freeze.

It should be obvious that the US won’t get its debt under control unless it sharply reduces government spending, including on health and pensions that have simply become unaffordable. The US is not much behind Britain and the eurozone when it comes to the horrific shape of public finances. The only advantage, for now, is the dollar’s status as the world’s reserve currency (and of course the country’s control over its own monetary policy).

But that doesn’t change the basic fact – you cannot spend your way out of a fiscal crisis. The current path is unsustainable. The Obama prescription of more debt, more spending and more taxes is a triple ticket to ruin, plain and simple.

But, it would be unfair to focus solely on the US, for here in Britain we are in an even greater mess.

The UK has not only the world’s highest total debt/GDP (along with Japan) but also one of the worst budget deficits at 12.6% of GDP. (According to OECD, only Iceland and Greece have higher deficits, at 15.7% and 12.7%, respectively. The UK is expected to post a 12.8-13% deficit this year, overtaking Greece.)

The speed of the debt run-up has been nothing short of alarming. Unsurprisingly, Britain is already paying higher interest rates to borrow than Spain or Italy. While the yields on gilts have recently risen significantly, they are heading far higher – as soon as the markets start taking a look at other basket-case economies aside of Greece. The pound has fallen by some 25% vs the dollar, and has much further to go unless the markets start seeing some credible solutions from Britain.

Yet there is no political will to face the excessive debt, no meaningful plans for deficit reduction. Gordon Brown’s government has rejected any idea of implementing spending cuts in 2010/2011. And the opposition? David Cameron said spending cuts during the early part of a Conservative government wouldn’t be ‘particularly extensive’.

Government spending has exploded over the 13 years of Labour governments and is now completely out of control. But one would look in vain for austerity measures and severe fiscal tightening, not just from Labour, but also from the (so-called) Conservatives.

The micro-cuts that both the government and the Tories are proposing will not even make a dent in the monstrous amount of public spending. The pledges to ring-fence all main areas of spending, including the wasteful, bureaucratic and inefficient NHS, instantly expose any deficit reduction plans as lacking of credibility.

What remains are tax raises. As if Gordon Brown’s hike of higher earner income tax from 40% to 50% (or 62% once national insurance contributions are added on) wasn’t bad enough, further tax increases are likely on the way. All that (along with the insanity of the additional 50% bonus tax) will only achieve one thing – further damage to the dwindling private sector already suffocated by a gargantuan web of high taxes, red tape, hostile regulation and uncertain political environment.

From Labour’s point of view, there is no harm in further undermining the only economically productive part of the economy. Expansion of government and redistribution of wealth are the objectives. What Brown and Obama have in common is their disdain for and antagonism toward anyone earning (or striving to earn) a decent income, and the desire to redistribute from the hard working and productive to the idle and unproductive.

It matters little which party wins the upcoming general elections; all three of the country’s main political parties have fully embraced ‘progressive’ (read socialist) ideas. A Tory victory may be slightly less disastrous than another Labour term, but nothing that the party is offering will set Britain onto the right path.

And the people have only themselves to blame. Thanks to the vast expansion of government too many millions are now enjoying an idle life of welfare-dependency. Add the millions more in public sector jobs with their high wages and appallingly generous pensions, and it is little wonder that politicians are unwilling to do anything that would anger the majority of the voters.

We have become a society with an overwhelming sense of entitlement – at the expense of those who still believe in self-reliance and hard work, only to see their wealth stolen by the parasites. This unsustainable situation will inevitably blow up, and deservedly so. Only then will a new cycle be able to start. And perhaps, just perhaps, we will even witness a return to common sense one day – as in smaller government, less interference in the free markets and the productive sector, less dependency and more self-reliance.

But in the meantime, as public debt is becoming a crushing burden on most developed economies, the only thing that appears certain is a widespread sovereign debt crisis (and defaults) a few years from now.

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